Yemen: Beyond the Proxy Lens
Yehya Abuzaid
Yehya Abuzaid is a guest writer for The Global Citizen. This piece was originally written in Fall 2019 and is also published by Threads Magazine.
A map of current territorial holdings in Yemen by warring factions. Taken from Stable Seas.
Iran and Saudi Arabia are some of the most influential regional players in the Middle East. Their competition throughout the region has led many observers to characterize their competition as a regional “cold war.” This “cold war” framework has mistakenly been used to characterize the worst humanitarian crisis in the world: the conflict in Yemen that has been raging since 2015. However, such a superficial understanding of the crisis in Yemen not only grossly oversimplifies this complex conflict, it illustrates the conflict as a Sunni-Shia divide rather than a domestic issue exacerbated by regional players. This falsely allows Saudi Arabia justification in its intervention on the grounds of fighting against Iranian encroachment, and this mischaracterization takes us further away from finding potential solutions to the conflict. Therefore, there is an urgent need to understand the war for the complex crisis that it is, instead of writing it off as a proxy war. The goal of this article is to illuminate the complex situation in Yemen by deconstructing the prevailing narrative, understanding the role of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and local actors, and revealing how this conflict has impacted the 30 million Yemenis in the country.
A Brief Overview of the Conflict
In 2014, the Houthi rebels in Yemen allied with former president Ali Saleh (who had been deposed by a revolution a few years prior) and took the capital, Sanaa. Many were stunned that an alliance between the Houthi and Saleh was even possible as he had previously launched six wars against the group while in office. Nonetheless, it appeared as though there were enough mutual interests to overlook their differences. With Saleh’s connections to the military and the Houthis’ fighting experience, the capital fell with ease and the government soon followed. They placed the then-president of Yemen, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, under house arrest and forced him to resign, effectively leaving the Houthis and Saleh in control of the government. By 2015, Hadi fled to the Southern port city of Aden and the Houthis followed, taking provinces as they marched towards the city. By March, Saudi Arabia led a coalition—dubbed the “Saudi-led coalition”—at the invitation of Hadi’s government and declared war, initiating airstrikes and eventually sending ground troops.
Since then, the conflict has metamorphosed into one of the most complex and horrific conflicts of this century. Saudi Arabia continues to back Hadi against the Houthis despite the stalemate. The Houthis themselves have consolidated their control over the north and killed off Ali Saleh for trying to turn on them in return for Saudi support. They have also developed their drone and missile program beyond what many had anticipated. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), a crucial player in the Saudi-led coalition, has armed and trained the Southern Separatists who fought against both Hadi’s troops and the Houthis. All of this is to say that the conflict is complex, and it will soon become apparent why a simple Saudi Arabia versus Iran explanation doesn’t do the conflict justice and only furthers the suffering of the Yemeni people.
The Problem with the Prevailing Narrative
The issue in seeing the conflict through a Saudi-Iranian lens is that it not only mischaracterizes the conflict, but it enables the war and actively prevents the international community from addressing the root causes. For example, when CNN states “Shiite-majority Iran and Sunni-dominated Saudi Arabia are locked in a strategic contest for influence across the Middle East. Now, the epic chess match has spread into Yemen, Saudi Arabia's southern neighbor” it gives the impression that the conflict is primarily based upon a sectarian divide. If that was indeed the case, it would appear logical that Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia would back the Sunnis and Shia-majority Iran would back the Houthis. While sectarianism does play a part, it is overshadowed by other more tangible concerns like resource management and political representation. Sectarianism didn’t stop Yemenis from protesting together during the Yemeni revolution in 2011 (which saw massive demonstrations against the government and successful overthrowing of the president). This dichotomy also fails to capture the fact that the Houthis are Zaidi, a sect within Shia Islam almost exclusive to Yemen and different from the one in Iran. Furthermore, few Sunnis are fighting on the basis of protecting Sunni Islam; many fight as part of complex tribal alliance systems, historical grievances, or political influence they would lose if the Houthis win.
The other issue with this perception is that Iran is hardly involved in the conflict when being compared to Saudi Arabia or the UAE. Their involvement has been limited to small arms shipments and sending military advisors to Yemen (likely in an effort to help the Houthis develop sophisticated drone technology). This is minimal support when compared to the massive weapons deliveries, training, and diplomatic support Iran has given other groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon or militias in Iraq. In these cases, Iran took an active initiative in creating or propping up these forces.
By contrast, the Houthis fought the aforementioned six wars against the Saleh government in the 2000’s largely by themselves. Even then, US officials, in a leaked diplomatic cable from 2009, noted how the Yemeni government sought to mischaracterize them as Iranian proxies to gain more support from the US. When the Houthis took Sanaa in 2014, as mentioned earlier, US intelligence concluded Iran warned the group not to do so, and they proceeded to ignore the warning. More recently Brian Hook, the US State Department’s Iran envoy, stated that Iran “clearly does not speak for the Houthis” and highlighted the limited influence Iran has in the conflict. This only adds to reports made by the UN Panel of experts whose assessment reported that Iranian support is either relatively small or knowledge on the matter is inconclusive. All of this displays how the Houthi rebellion, as mentioned earlier, is an indigenous movement, and Iran’s role in the conflict is notable but not significant enough to warrant the lens of a proxy war or a regional cold war. However, this does not mean that Iran isn’t gaining anything from the war. In fact, the war has been very financially costly for Saudi Arabia with little investment from Iran. Furthermore, as Iran previously maintained friendly relations with the Houthis, the conflict has solidified an alliance that was very weak prior to the war. However, they did not seek to create this war in order to gain a foothold near Saudi Arabia. Instead, the war is largely the result of local tensions that became inflamed and regional players that militarily involved themselves in the conflict to secure their own interests at the expense of Yemen.
This perception of proxy war is more than just wrong, it is harmful. When people see the Houthis as agents of Iran, Saudi actions become easier to justify. This has been done to justify American arms deals and logistical support for Saudi Arabia to counter Iran. The truth is that the United States stands to gain billions off of weapons deals and wants to keep allies like Saudi Arabia close to maintain its position in the Middle East. An Iran cover story is convenient to enact policies that are difficult to justify and otherwise morally irreprehensible. That is why a deeper analysis is needed to understand the roots of the conflict and see the realpolitik of foreign policy.
An In-Depth Look
To understand what caused the war we must first understand the backdrop of the national context in Yemen prior to the war. The immediate roots took place in the aforementioned 2011 protests that overthrew Saleh’s corrupt and inefficient regime. The revolution’s success led to the National Dialogue, a forum to facilitate Yemen’s transition towards a new government and constitution within two years. The Dialogue eventually concluded, and it was agreed that Yemen was to be federalized into six regions to give autonomy to the many different communities in Yemen while also maintaining the integrity of the state. However, the exact demarcation of the new federations left many dissatisfied with the proposal (including the Houthis). To understand why they were not thrilled with the proposal, we must understand who the Houthis actually are.
The Houthi, who also call themselves Ansar Allah (but are referred to here as Houthis or Houthi for consistency with sources), are considered a movement of tribes primarily from the north of Yemen fighting against the central government. They are referred to as Houthis because of the prominence of the Houthi tribe within the movement, not because all of them are from the same tribe. As mentioned earlier, this movement strongly identifies with the Zaidi sect of Islam which has been present in Yemen for hundreds of years. It is important to note that Houthis do not follow religious leaders in Iran, and, politically speaking, they have remained autonomous in their decisions. Hence, it explains why the Houthis disregarded Iranian advice to not take the capital.
With this information in mind, it is clear why the Houthis objected to the new federalized system. Their federal unit left them with the Salafi community that they had been in conflict with for years. The Salafi community also had support from Saudi Arabia in the past because spreading Saudi ideology in Yemen was a method of gaining influence in the country. Thus, even though the wider conflict is not based on sectarian division, the existing tension between the Houthi and Salafi communities in certain areas contributed to the initial stages of the conflict. This new system also restricted their access to the sea, preventing important economic resources and shipping. This was vital as the Houthis had very little trust in the central government who feared their expansion. When taking into account that Yemen imports most of its food, it becomes evident how important access to shipping and ports are to any party in Yemen, especially one wary of the central government. Considering the group that had beaten the Yemeni army six times and was stronger than ever, it was difficult to see them settling for less power in any new arrangement.
While there were issues with the National Dialogue, it still remains unclear exactly why the Houthis chose to march into Sanaa rather than take another course of action. Perhaps the plan was to extend Hadi’s transitional government beyond the two-year timeframe. Or, it could be that local dynamics we are not aware of motivated the coup. It is important, however, to note that the Houthis did not call for the domination of Yemen as it was unlikely they could realistically govern such a divided political landscape. Instead, it is likely that they wanted to strengthen their hand in any future government to secure their interests by asserting their power, likely at the expense of other parties in the country.
Even though the Houthis had reasonable grievances, it does not justify taking over the entire government and unfairly excluding other groups from governance. The fact of the matter is that nearly every group in Yemen had a reason to be dissatisfied and believed their needs were not being adequately addressed. Though this is true, it does not mean any group had the right to take over the government. The Houthi decision to form an alliance of convenience with former president Saleh was particularly hypocritical considering their cause is centered around combating corruption—something Saleh was infamous for. Their decision to take the capital alienated many groups and initiated a new phase in the conflict that allowed foreign players to directly intervene with military power.
It is clear that Iran’s influence is limited and the origins of the conflict are largely domestic. Yet, there remains a key question to answer: if the war has been costly for Saudi Arabia and the war is not about Iran, then why is Saudi Arabia in Yemen? Former United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and current UC Berkeley Professor Peter Bartu viewed the timing of the war as a diversion away from the internal takeover. Dr. Bartu explained in an interview for this piece that “to understand external decisions you look internally to the domestic affairs of a nation and that is the case with Saudi Arabia in Yemen.” This refers to the fact that, at the same time as events in Yemen began unfolding, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia died and King Salman and his son Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman (MbS) succeeded him. As the new King began consolidating power, he continued to give important positions to MbS, thus leaving other family branches out of power. The war in Yemen served as a diversion away from this internal power struggle.
There is another, more simple, factor at play: inexperience. In 2015 MbS was the youngest Minister of Defence in the world and was already facing a major foreign policy crisis. The Saudis traditionally enjoyed some influence in Yemen but now the Houthis, who resented the Saudis for their involvement in Saleh’s wars in the 2000s, were the strongest power in Yemen. MbS’ lack of experience is evident as reports indicate he believed the war would end in six weeks—an obvious miscalculation considering the aforementioned six wars against Saleh and the Saudi air force. From his perspective, a six-week campaign against the Houthis would not only divert attention away from his consolidation but also instate a loyal government in Yemen that could secure Saudi interests in the region. For instance, a loyal Yemeni government could ensure strategic locations such as the Bab el-Mandeb Strait by allowing Saudi Arabia to militarize it and protect the flow of Saudi oil through the waterway. Instead, MbS is left with missile attacks over his country, attacks on oil shipments, and a costly war that has been dubbed “Saudi Arabia’s Vietnam.”
The Humanitarian Costs
Talk about Yemen is scant in American media. If it is covered it is likely to remind the public that Yemen is, and has been for years, the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. Millions are on the brink of starvation, diseases like Cholera wreak havoc, airstrikes have led to massive civilian casualties, and there are millions of internally displaced people. This is the making of all sides acting with impunity and falsely believing that the ends justify the means.
Though the Houthis are an indigenous movement they, like the Saudi-led coalition, are willing to violate the rights of Yemenis both militarily and politically. The Houthis have used mines in civilian zones, indiscriminately shelled cities, abducted civilians, and have widespread corruption. The Houthi takeover in 2014 represented a shift from dialogue to armed intimidation in moving forward with Yemen’s transition. It is true that the transitional government had many issues such as corruption and ineffectiveness, but the Houthi decision solved nothing and exacerbated everything. Their willingness to accept Ali Saleh as a partner displays how their fight against corruption was, and still is, disingenuous. The Houthi saw an opportunity, and, though their motivations remain unclear, they allowed political opportunism to blind them to the needs of Yemen.
The Saudi-led coalition, for it’s part, has systematically destroyed Yemen with horrendous long term consequences. The airstrikes have not only led to absurdly unjustifiable civilian casualties occurring away from any military targets, but they have also destroyed much of Yemen’s vital infrastructure. Coupled with the use of double-tap strikes—attacking the same area twice to target rescue crews when they begin saving survivors—it becomes clear that airstrikes fail to take precautions to mitigate civilian casualties. A nationwide blockade has led to the increased costs of goods, leading to reports of many starving to death as well as stunting the growth of thousands of malnourished children. Currently, if the war were to stop in 2019, Yemen’s development would be set back by over twenty years. Additionally, the deaths caused directly and indirectly by the war would stand at 230,000, largely due to the blockade and airstrikes. Under present circumstances, if the war continues for another decade, nearly two million would be dead, and Yemen’s development would be pushed back by another forty years. It is no wonder why a recent United Nations Development Program report determined that Yemen is on track to become the poorest country in the world.
However, it does not end there. The destruction of cultural sites, environmental damage, and the psychological cost of war will continue to scar Yemen for decades to come. If the international community had the willingness and ability to effectively prosecute war criminals, no side of the Yemen conflict would leave untouched.
A man carries his child out of a ruined building after an Saudi coalition-led airstrike in Sanaa. Taken from The Atlantic in their 2017 article “More Than a Thousand Days of War in Yemen.”
Conclusion
This war has been raging for years and the uselessness of military intervention has become apparent. What has also become evident is that this conflict is incredibly complex and does not boil down to a simple proxy war. While Iran certainly supports the Houthis in whatever capacity they can, its frequently overstated. This misconception about the nature of the war gives the Saudi-led Coalition a cover for their actions—casting the Houthis as puppets of Iran and portraying the intervention as necessary to counter their regional rival. The reality is that the current situation is the product of policies in place by Ali Saleh, Hadi, MbS, and Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. The proxy war misconception results in the belief that the solution to the crisis lies in pressuring Iran or Saudi Arabia to end their support for the warring sides as though local actors have no say or responsibility.
While the situation remains bleak, there is hope that the warring sides have realized the futility of war. There have been reports of direct and indirect talks between the Saudis and Houthis and signs that the United States may finally be serious in promoting an end to the conflict. As the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen stated, “We're beginning to see in the hearts and minds of those who make decisions about the war, the desire to make peace and the recognition at a fundamental level that there is no prospect for military advantage; that there is nothing to be won on the battlefield, and that there is a huge victory, of course, to be made in the terrain of negotiation.” If the warring sides face the reality that a military solution is too costly both for themselves and the population the war may actually end. But, if the systemic policies that led to the war are perpetuated, it will be impossible to prevent another war and achieve long-lasting stability in a country that desperately needs it.
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