Neo-Soviet Grand Strategy: How Russia is Starting the New Scramble for Africa
Ali Hasan
Russian President Vladimir Putin meeting with CAR President Faustin-Archange Touadéra (Source: Russian Office of the President)
Originally written February 10, 2019
First, Some History
Amidst the Cold War, the US and the USSR vied for territorial control in strategic and resource-abundant locations across the third world. Africa, possessing some of the richest energy and precious materials deposits in the world and occupied by recently-created states vulnerable to the influence of the aforementioned megaliths, was a prime target for proxy control.
Many are familiar with the larger struggles for diplomatic control over Africa: Egypt and its on-again, off-again relationships with both the US and the USSR (and that connection’s prominence in Arab-Israeli affairs), the sought-after alliances in the Horn of Africa with its premier access to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, as well as the myriad of attempts by colonial powers to maintain soft power over their former holdings. But, what is often ignored (and central to the current issue today) is the Soviet Union’s presence in Central Africa.
The Soviet Union had played a large role in aiding the leadership of many central African nations in their quest to full statehood, providing everything from arms deals for proxy wars in Angola to infrastructure funding for the Central African Republic—frequently out-matching former colonial powers’ (many of whom were allied with the US during the Cold War) influence in the region. But, since the fall of the USSR, central Africa has had to rely on the aid of international communities and the Western World, many of whom are far less tolerant of the human rights abuses and destabilizing practices than their Soviet predecessors.
Russian Meddling
Fast forward to today where Russia is rapidly starting to restore its former influence in the central African region. President Vladimir Putin, known for his poorly-veiled desire to return Russia to its former stature, has led the push for increased involvement in many African countries—most especially, the Central African Republic (CAR).
We left off with the international community and the Western World being the only place left to turn to for these states in need, so how did Russia manage to unilaterally regain access into the region and expand its influence to a level of concern for the world at large? Well, as one might have guessed, the international community has been somewhat preoccupied by recent issues in the Middle East, Latin America, East Asia, and Europe which have been deemed more urgent than the perpetually dismal state of affairs in central Africa. Russia seems to have seized upon this opportunity of distraction on the part of its Western colleagues in the UN Security Council and dove head-first into the Central African Republic.
As a side note: it is important to notice a trend in international relations that diverges between the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. During the Cold War, Soviet involvement in central Africa (and around the world) was looked upon with much chagrin by the international community (of which the established powers were mostly first-world nations). American-Soviet involvement in the region was characterized by combative, acidic attitudes that were only tempered by a thin layer of mutually assured destruction to simmer all-out war down to passive-aggressive hostility. However, in this post-Cold War era, we see a very different form of global involvement taking place. Instead of antagonizing the United Nations and other global bodies, Russia is working within them to assert its power in central Africa.
Russia helped spearhead the UN’s “Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic” (MINUSCA), contributes (along with China) the majority of peacekeepers in the country, has pushed the UN to pass resolutions propping up CAR’s government and military, and is suspected of using its deals with central African states to influences their votes in the United Nations. It appears that Russia has abandoned the Soviet strategy of being the antagonist to global cooperation and has instead embraced the diplomatic systems and infrastructure built by its former first world rivals. Russia’s calculus has clearly determined that manipulating these institutions to its advantage is far more beneficial than trying to work against them. It has clearly taken advantage of the aforementioned distraction on the behalf of the Western world (especially given internal problems such as Trump’s increasingly isolationist foreign policy goals, the EU’s struggle with Brexit, and the domestic political disarray of several European states following the recent refugee crisis) to act when no one bothered to look, and Russia unilaterally monopolized—using the resources intended for joint action—“international” diplomacy in CAR.
Russia has also still maintained an intensive course of singular action in CAR in order to build the influence it so desperately seeks. Throughout 2017 and 2018, CAR President Faustin-Archange Touadéra signed multiple agreements with President Putin. These agreements largely remain a mystery but likely include significant military and security deals for the embattled CAR government. In the past couple years, Russia has sent a host of arms shipments as well as military instructors and 255 civilian “advisors'' to CAR; the most notable of which is the current “special advisor” to President Touadéra, Valery Zakharov. Zakharov is the public face of the Russo-CAR relationship and is responsible for shielding attention from any possible international incidents involving the two countries. Incidents including the Wagner Group—a private military contracting firm owned by Russian oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhen (who we will get into later)—illicitly providing mercenaries to CAR for ambiguous purposes, unsupervised “negotiations” between Russia and several rebel groups in and beyond CAR, the murder of three Russian journalists sent to report on Russia’s involvement in CAR, or VTB Bank’s (a Russian state bank) “accidental” loan of $12,000,000,000 to the CAR government.
So what would Russia want with CAR? CAR consistently ranks at the bottom of the human development index, half of its population requires humanitarian aid, 20% of its population is displaced, and 80% of CAR’s territory is held by fractured rebel groups that are currently at war with the established government (which itself only continues to exist due to the efforts of the UN and Russia). So why does Russia, a country beset with its own economic and development issues, want to give so much of its time and money in this unequivocally failed state?
Essentially, Russia sees CAR (and central Africa as a whole) as an investment. CAR’s state of perpetual civil war is an open market for one of Russia’s largest industries—arms production and trade (of which Russia is the second-largest provider in the world, after the US). Even if Russia is only (officially) dealing arms with FACA (CAR’s official military and security force), a UN panel has cited Russia’s arms exports as stimulating rebel groups to stockpile as well, almost begging for the chance of war (and potential emerging markets for Russia). And, given the dire need of CAR and other central African states for Russia’s security assistance in the region, they have been more than willing to sell-off their lucrative natural resources for a fraction of their cost. As the EU is increasingly shying away from Russia as a partner in energy and natural resources, central Africa will become increasingly important and Russia is preemptively staking a claim.
But Russia’s involvement isn’t strictly economic, there are serious global security implications for these relationships as well. Russia’s heavy military involvement and infrastructure in CAR represents a threat for the southern flank of NATO. Russia has poured billions of dollars into deals with Egypt and the African Union (two important strategic partners with NATO), while the US, under the Trump administration, has taken the aforementioned route of diplomatically retreating from the region (and NATO itself) entirely. Russia has also aided the development of central African telecommunications services (namely, satellites) which it has allegedly used to coordinate cyber-attacks against Europe and the US. Russia recently attempted to install some means of military infrastructure in Djibouti (a state on the Horn of Africa that’s home to many separate military installations controlled by the US, Japan, France, China, and Italy) but, likely due to the interference of one or more of the aforementioned states, was denied. Russia has taken this disappointment in stride and is currently in-talks to build a “logistics center” in neighboring Eritrea.
The Wagner Group
This brings us to the Wagner Group. The Wagner Group is a private military contractor funded by Kremlin-affiliated Russian oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin. Prigozhin, known as “Putin’s Chef”, was also behind the Internet Research Agency revealed by Robert Mueller to have led the misinformation campaign on social media during the 2016 US Presidential Elections. While Prigozhin funds the Wagner Group, the firm itself is led by Dmitri Utkin (Wagner), a former GRU Spetsnaz operative. In fact, despite private military contractors officially being illegal under Russian law, the Wagner Group is known for hiring mercenaries from and being protected by the GRU and the Russian Ministry of Defense. This set of circumstances begs the question if the Russian government relies so heavily on private military contractors, why doesn’t it (like many other major powers) legalize the operation of said firms? Simply put, Russia keeps entities like the Wagner Group illegal to avoid being accountable for their actions and preserving their capacity as an unofficial, clandestine military used for the Ministry of Defense’s less tasteful security operations. So long as the Wagner Group remains illegal, it remains unregulated and free to act as the government wishes, and the rule of law in Russia is plastic enough to allow any and all illegal enterprises to operate so long as the government allows. The Wagner Group maintains plausible deniability and low (official) body counts for Russian excursions abroad (namely, in Ukraine and Syria) while bypassing the bureaucracy and accountability.
In CAR, the Wagner Group has largely been (to the best of our knowledge) training FACA and securing natural resource interests in the country. Last year, a team of Russian journalists was deployed to CAR in order to investigate the Wagner Group’s involvement in the area. The journalists were supported by the Investigations Management Center, led by Russian business magnate and exiled Putin critic Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Orkhan Dzhemal (a seasoned journalist famous for covering Muslim extremism in Chechnya, Syria, and beyond), Alexander Rastorguev (documentary filmmaker and Putin critic), and Kirill Radchenko (cameraman and co-producer of a Putin-critical documentary with Rastorguev) were sent to CAR by Khodorkovsky and turned up dead three days later. The circumstances surrounding their deaths are quite extensive and too coincidental (and sloppy) to not imply premeditation, so I will not go into them here, but suffice it to say that all roads lead back to Prigozhin. Others who looked into their deaths were subsequently harassed, assaulted, and poisoned for doing so.
Conclusion
Russia’s involvement in central Africa has heretofore gone unnoticed. But, given the recent deaths of Dzhemal, Rastorguev, and Radchenko, the international community has renewed its scrutiny of Russian involvement in the region. However, Russia’s preparations have served it well. Several central African countries as well as the African Union itself have decided to cooperate with Russia. Russia provides the moral leniency to consistently support the actions of despots and a fluid rule of law without the inconvenience of such trivial things as enforcement of human rights. Russia already has its foothold in MINUSCA and UN involvement in the region, and it provides the plurality of resources for “international” aid in the region. The combination of these factors make it relatively impossible to stem Russian involvement in the region.
The circumstances, however, have not stopped some from trying. France—CAR’s former colonizer—has started increasing aid and recently signed a deal to send $27.2 million in weapons shipments to the embattled government. The European Union has also pledged to support CAR’s government and help provide for its security infrastructure. But, I fear that these promises, even if they are fulfilled, are simply too little too late. Russia has established itself in the region in ways that the West simply cannot. This, combined with its actions in the US and Eastern Europe, have categorically demonstrated that Russia is aiming for something. As lame and vague as that sounds, it’s truly the best insight anyone has at the moment. It has consolidated its holdings across the world, disrupted domestic politics in the West, and diversified its resources at an exceptional rate. And, in this new phase of proxy war, Africa has emerged as a key battleground. France and the EU have already started mobilizing and will likely pursue relationships with African states where Russia has not already swung its weight. However, Russia will maintain the comparative advantage in courting failed and vulnerable states because its standards for acceptable behavior (coupled with its use of unofficial forces like the Wagner Group) are far lower and allow a greater range of freedom for the misdemeanors of its client states. While the West is no stranger to supporting human rights abusers and despots, its threshold for doing so (especially in the age of open information) is paltry when compared to Russia. Especially following the War on Terror and an age of mass media proliferation and an increasingly isolationist and nationalist West, large-scale, morally-ambiguous ventures in developing corners of the world are not en vogue in the first world. Any attempts to counter Russia’s increasing influence will be seen as wasteful, hawkish, and irrelevant; note that Russia has played a direct or indirect role in supporting or restoring many of these ultranationalist, isolationist movements in the West. In conclusion, this situation is likely the start of a long string of worrying events that have yet to be realized in Africa and the rest of the world. And, in a world of confounding and contradicting solutions that surround international relations and intervention, this series of events seems almost inevitable in the near future.
Epilogue
A colleague of mine, Clement Messeri (you should really go check out his work, it’s excellent) recently suggested that this article should include some outlook or prescription for what the West should do in this situation. I have thought about this and come to the conclusion that, in Africa, the Western World has been decisively beat by Putin. Simply put, there is little to nothing the US or Europe can do to counter Russia’s growing influence in Africa. At best, the West could cling to those African countries that have embraced the Western ethos (such as South Africa), but those are few and far between (as well as beset by their own host of problems).
It bears reiterating that the West, while able to match Russia’s monetary contribution, cannot match the lengths at which Russia will go to preserve its influence in Africa. The West’s current preoccupation with nationalism (again, many of which were prompted by Putin), along with the media and citizenry’s increasingly critical observance of their home countries’ ventures abroad, for better or worse undermine any attempts for these countries to sink to Putin’s level. Russia has hijacked and manipulated major international efforts in Africa to the point where it has a controlling share of these operations, and Putin has already secured deals and relationships with his cohort of African leaders to the point where it is near impossible for the client states to leave his sphere of influence. If the existential conflict between Russia and the West reaches a boiling point, the West may secure some African allies in the New Scramble for Africa, but it is a game that has already been won, and not by the West.
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